

Erasmus Platform for Sustainable Value Creation

Working paper

A finance approach to climate stress testing

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Executive summary

If the current emission trajectories are maintained, climate policies may suddenly tighten to halt global warming. This is expected to come with substantial costs for the owners of financial assets. Our research therefore addresses the potential impact of climate policies on the balance sheets of banks. As we take an industry-level approach, we are able to provide a detailed investigation into the differences in impact between industries and across particular carbon taxation scenarios. In this stress test, we focus on both equity and debt instruments.

Findings of our research

First, estimated market value losses for the whole Dutch banking system range between €4.5 billion and €35.8 billion, under a €100 per tonne carbon tax, depending on policy choices. Compared to the outcomes of regular stress test exercises, we find that the estimated losses of our model are substantial.

Second, losses for the Dutch banking sector are primarily driven by exposures to corporate loans and debt, and to a lesser extent by residential mortgages and equity. The main reasons for this finding are the limited holdings of equity instruments by Dutch banks and the fact that market value losses of real estate are mostly the burden of households, not the banking sector. Looking at the corporate loans and debt exposure in more detail, we identify five distinct industries that drive between 83% and 91% of total market value losses. These are the electricity, gas, steam and airconditioning, the manufacturing of coke and refined petroleum, the water transportation, the basic metal manufacturing, and the air transport industry.

Third, the market value losses for Dutch banks' balance sheets increase exponentially with the euro amount of the carbon tax. This exponential increase in market value losses is counteracted by some industries reaching the point where the full market value of the asset is lost. This is the case for four industries when a carbon tax of €200 is implemented overnight and organisations are not, or only partly, able to pass the tax onto consumers. These are the electricity, gas, steam and airconditioning, the manufacturing of coke and refined petroleum, the basic metal manufacturing, and the air transport industry.

Additionally, if more stringent climate policies are implemented, it is highly likely that the fossil fuel extraction industries are affected by reduced demand or by other types of climate policies. As such, we assessed the results for a specific scenario that estimates the market value losses for the Dutch banking sector in case a major share of fossil fuel assets becomes stranded. We found that an 'unburnable carbon' scenario alone does not seem to affect the Dutch banking sector severely.

Effects of policy implementation

The results of our study show that when carbon taxation is phased-in over a period of ten years, the market value losses can be reduced. In the same line, following the results of our sensitivity analysis, increasing the ability to reduce carbon footprints, decreases the market value losses for banks. This is driven by the banks' exposures to corporate loans and debts.

On the other hand, we can conclude that lowering the risk-free interest rate to 0% increases the estimated market value losses. These increases are higher for the scenarios in which the carbon tax is partly passed on to consumers. The losses are mostly driven by market value losses for residential mortgages, due to their relatively long duration.

Usefulness for actors in the financial sector

For macro-prudential supervisors, our results indicate that strong carbon pricing policies have the potential to substantially alter the market value of a broad range of assets on banks' balance sheets. As a consequence, macro-prudential authorities may wish to engage in an ongoing dialogue with climate policymakers in order to achieve early and orderly decarbonisation of the economy instead of a late and sudden decarbonisation.

For micro-prudential supervisors, our results point to those assets and industries that are of a heightened risk of losing their value in an energy transition. This could have implications for the risk scoring of individual banks that are, to a greater extent, exposed to these industries. The higher risk scoring could in turn translate into higher capital charges and/or concentration limits for carbon-intensive exposures.

Finally, our results have implications for banks in their assessment and pricing of transition-related financial risks. In particular, it provides estimates of market value losses in the tail-end of the distribution. This can help banks to set risk limits, and could provide input into their loan origination, investment, and pricing decisions.

Defining appropriate climate policies

The findings of our novel climate stress testing methodology show that, depending on the policies implemented, banks may incur substantial losses. These first-round loss estimates can be perceived as a lower bound, as second-round effects could lead to further losses. Some of our obtained loss estimates are two to three times higher than those estimated by traditional stress tests. This underscores the importance of designing climate policies that accelerate decarbonisation and safeguard financial sector soundness.

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1 Abstract

There is increasing interest in assessing the impact of climate policies on the value of financial sector assets, and consequently on financial stability. Prior studies either take a “black box” macro-modelling approach to climate stress testing or focus solely on equity instruments – though banks’ exposures predominantly consist of debt. We take a more tractable finance (valuation) approach at the industry-level and use a Merton contingent claims model to assess the impact of a carbon tax shock on the market value of corporate debt and residential mortgages. We calibrate the model using detailed, proprietary exposure data for the Dutch banking sector. For a €100 to €200 per tonne carbon tax we find a substantial decline in the market value of banks’ assets equivalent to 4-63% of core capital, depending on policy choices.

“Changes in climate policies, new technologies and growing physical risks will prompt reassessments of the values of virtually every financial asset.”

Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England¹

¹ Speech at the 2019 Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures TCFD Summit, Tokyo (Oct. 8, 2019).

2 Introduction

There is a substantial gap between Green House Gas (GHG) emission paths that are consistent with keeping global warming well below two degrees Celsius and emissions paths that result from current climate policies (Rogelj et al., 2018). In recent years, this gap between practice and policy goals has led central banks, financial supervisors, and researchers to investigate the financial risks stemming from climate change (“physical risks”) and from transitioning towards a low-carbon economy (Campiglio et al., 2018; Nieto, 2019). The latter “transition risks” may primarily arise if much more stringent climate policies are implemented by governments to follow up on the 2015 Paris Agreement (Batten et al., 2016).

Decarbonizing the economy is expected to come at an economic cost, at least in the short run (Acemoglu et al., 2012; Nordhaus, 1992). Depending on policy choices, some of these costs will likely be borne by owners of financial assets, including banks, insurance companies, and pension funds (Smale et al., 2006; Scholtens and Van Der Goot, 2014). For example, higher taxes on GHG emissions can lead to additional costs for firms in GHG-intensive sectors and more rapid write-off of their capital investments (i.e., “stranded assets”), reducing firms’ market values and increasing their credit risk. These costs can be substantial and range across a wide variety of sectors and asset classes (Leaton, 2011). Estimates of the implied prices of CO₂-equivalent (CO₂e) emissions needed to limit global warming to below two degree Celsius range from \$15-\$360 per tonne in 2030 and from \$45-\$1000 per tonne in 2050 (Stiglitz et al., 2017).

From the perspective of both financial institutions and regulators concerned with financial stability, a key question is what the potential impact of such climate policies is on the balance sheets of financial institutions. Several studies have started to explore how climate policies adversely affect the value of financial institutions’ balance sheets and, for extreme scenarios, can cause systemic financial crises.² Battiston, Mandel, Monasterolo, Schütze, and Vistentin (2017) perform a climate stress test for Eurozone banks, looking at the impact of climate policies on the equity exposures of European banks while at the same time allowing for second-round effects resulting from exposures between financial institutions. Vermeulen, Schets, Lohuis, Kölbl, and Jansen (2019) propose a framework for climate stress tests that builds on macro-economic stress test methods. This work fits into a broader literature on financial sector stress testing (see, for example, Upper, 2011; Henry et al., 2013; Ong, 2014).

Our main contribution to the emerging literature on climate stress tests is two-fold. First, our research contributes to the climate stress test literature by tractably

² From a policy perspective several central banks have started performing climate stress tests, or have announced to start doing them. These include the Dutch central bank, the Bank of England, and the Banque de France (Lehmann, 2020).

modelling the industry-level impact of climate policies on the value of financial sector holdings of both equity and debt instruments. The literature to date either uses indirect and less tractable (“black box”) macro modelling to determine financial sector impacts or focuses exclusively on equity instruments while assuming that the value of certain financial instruments evaporates completely.

³Especially for banks, it is crucial to understand the effects of climate policies on debt instruments, since the majority of bank assets are subordinated in nature. For example, in the euro area, at least 85% of all banking assets consist of debt, while only 2% is equity (see Table 1). Second, because we take an industry-level approach, we are able to investigate the differences in impact between industries and across specific carbon taxation scenarios in detail (e.g., different price levels and policy design choices). Further research along these lines could inform the alignment of climate policies, and carbon taxes in particular, with the objective of financial stability.

To assess the impact of climate policies on the financial sector assets, we build on the option valuation and structural credit risk modelling literature (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1974). Specifically, we employ the ideas by Merton (1974), who models the structural factors that determine the market value of debt. Merton’s key insight is that equity can be viewed as a residual claim on assets after the debt has been repaid. This implies that the equity holder has a call option on the value of the firm’s assets, where the payoff is either zero (in case of default) or the value of assets minus the face value of the debt. Conversely, the debt holder has a risk-free bond and is short a put option of the firm’s assets. Overall, Merton’s contingent claims approach implies that a negative asset valuation shock will affect the value of both equity and debt in a non-linear way.

We modify the standard Merton (1974) model to account for mortgages that have additional safeguards built-in for the lender. Specifically, the traditional Merton model assumes that default occurs when at maturity the value assets V lies below the face value of debt L . For corporates, this is likely a valid approximation, although some extensions have been proposed to relax this assumption.⁴ However, for mortgages, which represent an important asset class for banks, default is more complicated since these often have additional safeguards built-in for the lender, such as recourse to the wealth and income of the borrower. This implies that, in a Merton setting, we need to adjust the default trigger for residential mortgages. Following Sy (2014), we take an approach where mortgage default is conditional on both insolvency (i.e., the value of the house falling below the value of the mortgage) and delinquency (i.e., not having sufficient liquidity to make the periodical payment on a loan).

Our empirical analysis focuses on the banking sector in the Netherlands, for which we use detailed and proprietary loan and debt exposure data from the Dutch

³ Macro financial stress testing typically estimates the impact of scenarios on GDP and other macro-variables first and then uses those variables as inputs into financial risk models. Final results are obtained through several layers of modelling employing a large and complex set of equations, increasing the potential for modelling error and making it harder to intuitively interpret results.

⁴ For example, Black and Cox (1976) look at the case where restructuring already occurs before V falls below L .

central bank (DNB). This includes residential mortgage data from the DNB loan-level database and corporate loan, debt, and equity data that are aggregated to 4-digit NACE sector level. Our exposure dataset includes the three largest banks in the Netherlands that collectively cover 79% of total assets in the Dutch banking sector. Total assets in the Dutch banking sector were €2,381 billion in 2017. Furthermore, we calibrate a Merton contingent claims model to allocate asset valuation losses to junior (equity-like), and senior (debt-like) claim holders of the asset. For corporates, we use representative samples of firms from the Orbis Bureau van Dijk database to obtain estimates of leverage and asset volatility by sector. For listed firms, we link these samples to Thomson Reuters Datastream to obtain market estimates for asset volatility. For non-listed firms, we estimate asset value volatility using a cross-sectional regression model. For residential mortgages, we disaggregate exposures to different types of dwellings (i.e., apartments, terraced houses, and detached houses) per loan-to-value (LTV) bucket and per remaining maturity bucket. We also obtain estimates for house price value volatility and the probability of delinquency. We then estimate asset valuation shocks by valuing both the negative cash flows of the carbon tax and the total cash flows of representative firms and real estate, which leads to valuation shocks per industry and real estate segment. These shocks are calibrated using carbon intensity (scope 1 emissions or "carbon footprint") data obtained from Eurostat, which are available for most 2-digit NACE sectors. For this reason, we further aggregate our exposure data to the same 2-digit NACE level. With minor exceptions, all our data are for 2017.

To perform the stress test, we define four carbon taxation scenarios that differ in their severity and likelihood. Our main scenarios are based on the introduction of a €100 carbon tax, which lies well within current estimates of implied carbon prices that are needed to achieve the goals in the 2015 Paris Agreement. We differentiate our scenarios by assuming either an abrupt (overnight) or smooth (10-year phase-in period) of the tax and by assuming either a regional application (no cost pass-through from firms to consumers) or a global application (50% cost pass-through from firms to consumers). Some of these policy scenarios are severe but not entirely implausible. They hence serve the purpose of investigating extreme policy scenarios, which is a common practice in financial sector stress testing (Cihák, 2007).

Our findings indicate that, depending on the policy scenario, market value losses range from €4.5 billion to €35.8 billion following the implementation of a carbon tax of €100. In the most severe scenario, in which carbon taxation is applied abruptly, and there is no pass-through (e.g., due to regional application), losses amount to 30% of the available Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital in the Dutch banking system and to 1.5% of total assets. When carbon taxation is instead phased-in over ten years, the losses as fractions of CET1 capital and total assets decline to 14% and 0.7%, respectively. For €200 per tonne carbon taxes, the market value losses increase exponentially, ranging from €17.9 billion to €75.2 billion. In the most severe scenario, this equals 63% of CET1 capital and to 3.2% of total assets. When carbon taxation is instead phased-in over ten years, the losses

as fractions of CET1 capital and total assets decline to 47% and 2.4%, respectively. Some of our €100 and €200 carbon tax scenarios show market value losses that are substantially (two to three times) higher than those obtained under traditional banking sector stress tests, of which the adverse scenarios typically result in declines in core capital around 20%.⁵ This may warrant increased attention of prudential policy makers to climate-related scenarios. It also underscores the importance of designing climate policies in such a way that they both achieve decarbonization in line with international agreements and safeguard financial sector soundness.

Furthermore, our findings shed light on vulnerable asset classes and sectors. We find that first-order market value losses for Dutch banks are primarily driven by exposures to corporate loans and debt, and to a lesser extent by residential mortgages and equity.⁶ Principal reasons for this finding are the low exposures of Dutch banks to equity instruments in transition-sensitive industries (i.e., less than 1% of total assets) and the low net present value of carbon taxes for most types of housing compared to their valuation, combined with recourse to a borrowers income on top of the recourse to the underlying real estate (which puts market value losses on real estate mostly as a burden to households and to a lesser extent on the banking sector). In the €100 carbon tax scenarios, the largest absolute contributions to market value losses are, in declining order, obtained for electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply (D.35), the manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products (C.19), water transport (H.50), the manufacture of basic metals (C.24), and air transport (H.51). Taken together, these five industries drive between 83% and 91% of the total market value losses, depending on the choice of scenario.

Overall, our results point to the substantial impact that climate-related policies can have on the market value of assets on the balance sheets of banks in the Netherlands. By tractably modelling the vulnerability of financial assets to carbon taxation, our analysis highlights the importance of debt exposures for their contribution to overall losses, and in particular the corporate loans and debt portfolio. In severe scenarios, climate policies may lead to substantial losses in the banking sector and our research, therefore, underlines the importance of adequately addressing the interlinkages between climate policies and financial stability (e.g., steering away from investments in long-term assets that are not compatible with a low carbon economy). Since our analysis focuses on direct (i.e., scope 1) carbon emissions and does not include second-order effects (e.g., through changing unemployment and interest rates), our outcomes are likely conservative, and we encourage further research to investigate further channels through which carbon taxes can affect financial institutions' balance sheets.

⁵ For example, the 2018 stress test by the European Banking Authority (EBA) finds that, on aggregate, the CET1 capital of EU banks declines by 19.2% in their adverse scenario. Furthermore, the Federal Reserve found that, on aggregate, the Tier 1 leverage ratio of US banks declines by 19.8% in their severely adverse scenario in their 2019 stress test.

⁶ Note that second-round losses on mortgage portfolios might be higher, for example if unemployment rates and/or interest rates were to rise. The effect of climate policies on such macro-variables is highly uncertain, however, and depends amongst others on additional policy choices (e.g., re-employment programs and industry compensation schemes).

3 Financial stress test model

In this section, we develop a tractable impact model that underlies our stress test. We set out a general approach which we further develop in the subsequent two sections. We also discuss assumptions and possible extensions.

3.1 General set-up

The primary goal of our modelling is to determine the impact of climate policy stress scenarios on the market value of debt and equity portfolios of banks. We do this by separating the aggregate exposures of banks into equity exposure and debt exposure in groups of assets k (from hereon: segments) that share similar vulnerability characteristics (e.g., carbon intensity). In principle, k can be at the level of an individual firm or real economy asset. However, given the exposure data that we have available, we will take k to represent either an industry (for firms) or real estate of a similar dwelling type. Total market value loss is given by:

$$\text{Total market value loss} = \sum_{k=1}^n \vartheta_{E,k} * \text{exposure}_{E,k} + \vartheta_{D,k} * \text{exposure}_{D,k} \quad (1)$$

with stress test coefficients $\vartheta_{E,k}$ for equity and $\vartheta_{D,k}$ for debt defined as follows:

$$\vartheta_{E,k} = \frac{MV_{E,k}^*}{MV_{E,k}} \text{ and } \vartheta_{D,k} = \frac{MV_{D,k}^*}{MV_{D,k}} \quad (2)$$

In the above formula, MV_k represents the market value of a group of assets k . An asterisk (*) is used to denote the market value after the scenario shock has been applied. Using this definition gives us the fraction of the market value of the portfolio that remains after the stress scenario is applied. Hence, the expected market value loss per unit of exposure can be written as $1 - \vartheta$.⁷

Section 3.2 provides the modelling of $\vartheta_{D,k}$ and $\vartheta_{E,k}$ as functions of a set of calibration parameters Θ_i and an asset value shock ξ_k . We follow Merton's (1974) structural credit risk model, which we extend to take into account more complicated default conditions that are characteristic of European mortgages with double recourse. The basic idea is to distribute the asset valuation shock ξ_k to holders of equity (E) and debt (D). This part of the stress test model can hence be viewed as covering the financial (right-hand) side of the corporate balance sheet. Since we take the calibration parameters to differ per asset i and calculate the

⁷ Since we are interested in the consequences for the market value of the bank balance sheet, we estimate the expected loss in risk-neutral terms (i.e., the probability of default is adjusted to reflect market participants' risk preferences).

stress test coefficients per segment k , we sum the outcomes of n individual assets making up a segment using a weighting parameter ω_i .

$$\vartheta_{E,k}, \vartheta_{D,k} = \sum_{i=1}^n \omega_i * f_{Merton}(\xi_k, \Theta_i) \quad (3)$$

In section 3.3, we put forward a stylized discounted cash flow model to determine a valuation shock ξ_k per segment. We model ξ_k such that it ranges between zero (no losses) and one (full loss of sector value). This can be viewed as the real (left-hand) side of the corporate balance sheet, representing the value of a physical bundle of assets. We take ξ_k to be a function of the scenario variable $\tau_{k,t}$ which represents the euro tax amount per tonne of CO2e emissions over time, and a set of vulnerability parameters $\Omega_{k,t}$ which we differentiate per segment k and which may vary over time t .⁸

$$\xi_k = f(\tau_{k,t}, \Omega_{k,t}) \quad (4)$$

3.2 Merton's structural credit risk model for asset valuation shocks

In a standard Merton structural debt framework, the market value of debt MV_D can be written as its risk-free value minus the risk-neutral expected loss (the latter being equivalent to a put option on the value of the assets). Following the notation of Giesecke (2002):

$$MV_D = L e^{-r(T-t)} - L e^{-r(T-t)} \left(N(-d_2) \right) - V_t N(-d_1) \quad (5)$$

with

$$d_1 = \frac{\ln\left(\frac{V_t}{L}\right) + \left(r + \frac{\sigma_V^2}{2}\right)(T-t)}{\sigma_V \sqrt{T-t}}$$

$$d_2 = \frac{\ln\left(\frac{V_t}{L}\right) + \left(r - \frac{\sigma_V^2}{2}\right)(T-t)}{\sigma_V \sqrt{T-t}},$$

where N is the probability of the standard normal density function below d . Hence MV_D can be expressed as a function of asset value V , contracted repayment L , time to maturity $T-t$, the standard deviation of asset value σ_V and the risk-free

⁸ Note that all our scenarios assume that the carbon tax applies equally to all segments k , hence for our analysis we can suffice by writing. This is however not a necessity; in practice climate policies often differentiate between industries. Vulnerability parameters in our analysis are the carbon footprint, the capacity to pass-on the carbon tax to consumers, adaptive capability, a sector specific discount rate, and (for mortgages) the probability of delinquency.

interest rate r . Furthermore, under the assumption that asset values follow a geometric Brownian motion, the volatilities of the firm and its equity are given by:

$$\sigma_E = \frac{V}{E} N(d_1) \sigma_V \quad (6)$$

For our purposes, we will assume an instantaneous shock ξ on asset value such that immediately after the shock asset value V^* is given by:

$$V^* = (1 - \xi)V, \quad (7)$$

which gives the market value of debt after the shock as:

$$MV_D^* = Le^{-r(T-t)} - Le^{-r(T-t)} \left(N(-d_2^*) \right) - V_t^* N(-d_1^*) \quad (8)$$

Replacing V^* with $(1 - \xi)V$, defining the ratio of contracted repayment to asset value (leverage ratio) as $R = L / V$ and dividing by the discounted exposure $Le^{-r(T-t)}$ we find that:

$$MV_D^* = 1 - \left(N(-d_2^*) \right) - ((1 - \xi)/R)e^{-r(T-t)} N(-d_1^*)$$

with

$$d_1^* = \frac{\ln\left(\frac{1 - \xi}{R}\right) + \left(r + \frac{\sigma_V^2}{2}\right)(T - t)}{\sigma_V \sqrt{(T - t)}} \quad (9)$$

$$d_2^* = \frac{\ln\left(\frac{1 - \xi}{R}\right) + \left(r - \frac{\sigma_V^2}{2}\right)(T - t)}{\sigma_V \sqrt{(T - t)}}$$

Hence,

$$\vartheta_D = \frac{MV_D^*}{MV_D} = \frac{1 - \left(N(-d_2^*) \right) - ((1 - \xi)/R)e^{-r(T-t)} N(-d_1^*)}{1 - \left(N(-d_2) \right) - (1/R)e^{-r(T-t)} N(-d_1)} \quad (10)$$

Thus, given a risk-free interest rate r , ϑ_D is a function of the asset valuation shock ξ , the leverage ratio R , asset value volatility σ_V and the time to maturity $T-t$. Moreover, equations (6) and (9) can be solved simultaneously in order to determine V and σ_V from E and σ_E . In a similar fashion, the Merton equation for equity is given by:

$$MV_E = V_t N(d_1) - L e^{-r(T-t)} N(d_2) \quad (11)$$

And following the same line of reasoning as for debt, we find that:

$$\vartheta_E = \frac{MV_E^*}{MV_E} = \frac{(1 - \xi) N(d_1^*) - R e^{-r(T-t)} N(d_2^*)}{N(d_1) - R e^{-r(T-t)} N(d_2)} \quad (12)$$

Merton model limitations and extension to mortgages

The Merton (1974) model is based on several assumptions, some of which have been challenged in subsequent research.⁹ One key assumption is that asset value follows a geometric Brownian motion, which implies that in a short interval of time, asset value can only change by a small amount (Merton, 1976). Several authors have noted that this is inconsistent with empirical observation, namely that in a short interval of time there can be large changes in stock prices or “jumps” (e.g., Cai and Kou, 2011). Moreover, in most segments, there are substantial costs associated with a default that is not captured by the Merton model (i.e., the model assumes that there are no specific costs resulting from triggering default). To account for these costs, some authors explicitly introduce recovery values (e.g., Benos and Papanastasopoulos, 2007; Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995). Both of these assumptions in the standard Merton model lead to potentially higher losses as a result of an asset valuation shock, implying that our model is more likely to underestimate than to overestimate potential losses.

On the other hand, specifically for mortgages, the Merton model may overestimate losses due to the recourse nature of most European mortgages. Recourse entitles the creditor to other household assets besides the value of the secured real estate, including other assets and future income. In contrast to some American mortgages, this implies that households are less prone to default on their mortgages in the face of asset valuation losses, even if the value of the real estate is lower than the value of the mortgage.¹⁰ To account for recourse, we model a more stringent default condition, rewriting equation (8) by dividing by the discounted exposure $L e^{-r(T-t)}$ and multiplying its last term by $N(-d_2) / N(-d_2)$:

$$MV_D / L e^{-r(T-t)} = 1 - N(-d_2) \left(1 - \frac{V_t}{L e^{-r(T-t)}} * \frac{N(-d_1)}{N(-d_2)} \right) \quad (13)$$

In this equation, $N(-d_2)$ is the risk-neutral probability of default and $N(-d_1) / N(-d_2)$ is the expected discounted recovery rate (Sy, 2014). For residential mortgages, we can then introduce a more strict default trigger by replacing the Merton probability of default $N(-d_2)$, which could be thought of as representing

⁹ For a full list of assumptions, see Merton (1974).

¹⁰ We note here that although a mortgage may legally be full-recourse, in practice this full-recourse is not always (fully) applicable. An example is the case of Ireland where in the aftermath of a housing crisis the central bank implemented regulations that severely restricted the ability of banks to contact or harass delinquent borrowers, making the Irish residential mortgages *de facto* limited recourse contracts (Connor and Flavin, 2015).

insolvency, by a more broad probability of default that is a multiplication of $N(-d_2)$ and the probability that a household will not have sufficient wealth and/or income to pay their instalment $P(\text{delinquent})$. If we assume that there is no correlation between $N(-d_2)$ and $P(\text{delinquent})$, equation (13) can then be rewritten as:

$$\frac{MV_D}{Le^{-r(T-t)}} = 1 - N(-d_2) * P(\text{delinquent}) * \left(1 - \frac{V_t}{Le^{-r(T-t)}} * \frac{N(-d_1)}{N(-d_2)}\right) \quad (14)$$

which leads to:

$$\vartheta_{D,M} = \frac{MV_D^*}{MV_D} = \frac{1 - N(-d_2^*) * P(\text{delinquent}) * (1 - (1 - \xi) / Re^{-r(T-t)} * N(-d_1^*) / N(-d_2^*))}{1 - N(-d_2) * P(\text{delinquent}) * (1 - 1 / Re^{-r(T-t)} * N(-d_1) / N(-d_2))} \quad (15)$$

Similar reasoning can be applied to determine the impact of the market value of the equity portion of mortgage exposures (or in general, exposures where default is triggered by combined but uncorrelated insolvency and delinquency).

3.3 Asset valuation shocks

To determine asset valuation shocks, we take the yearly CO2 emissions connected to the segments' activities γ_k (i.e., the sector-specific carbon footprint) and multiply this by the carbon tax τ_t . The total valuation impact of the tax can then be determined by discounting the tax-related cash flows, most of which occur in the future, into a net present value using an appropriate discount rate per segment r_k . Without any response from any of the actors involved (such as adjustments in the production process, the quantity or the price of products and/or making energy efficiency investments in real estate), an unanticipated shock to the carbon tax rate would lead to a reduction in the value of the bundle of assets that is equal to the present value of the additional (negative) cash flows. Assuming that there are no net tax effects, the impact of the tax shock on the net present value of a physical asset or firm can be thought of as follows:

$$NPV_{\text{tax}, k} = \sum_{t=0}^T (1 - r_k)^t * \gamma_k(-\tau_t) \quad (16)$$

Of course, it can be expected that firms and households respond in an attempt to offset the potential loss in their value after a carbon tax is announced. We account for this in two ways. First, one response that is well-documented in the literature is the pass-through of increasing costs for firms (in this case the carbon tax) into product prices (Fabra and Reguant, 2013; Smale, Hartley, Hepburn, Ward, and Grubb, 2006). This increase in price could partially offset the initial tax burden on producers. However, for most goods, an increasing price reduces the size of the market, which potentially leads to firms exiting the market or lowering their production volumes.¹¹ Therefore, in some of our scenarios, we allow for a non-

¹¹ Note that this could not only lead to *stranded assets* (e.g., oil reserves and specialized capital goods) as often referred to in the literature, but also *stranded business* (i.e., future earnings that are priced into firm value but are not expected under the new climate policy regime).

zero amount of pass-through that can change over time (e.g., due to contract renewals after certain periods), denoted by $\varphi_{k,t}$.¹² Second, our model takes into account the possibility that firms and households adjust their physical assets and their use over time, for example by substituting inputs (e.g., green for brown electricity) and by making additional investments (e.g., energy savings technologies and technologies that avoid atmospheric emissions such as carbon filters). We do this by allowing the carbon intensity per segment γ_k , and hence the tax burden, to change over time. We hence add a subscript t . We then arrive at the following expression for the valuation impact on the value of a physical asset or firm as:

$$NPV_{tax,k} = \sum_{t=0}^T (1 - r_k)^t * \gamma_{k,t} (1 - \varphi_{k,t}) (-\tau_t) \quad (17)$$

Finally, we relate the net present value of the tax shock to the total asset value, which gives us the fraction of the total asset value that is lost due to the carbon tax:

$$\xi_k = \frac{NPV_{tax,k}}{Total\ asset\ value_k} \quad (18)$$

¹² We will define two sets of scenarios with respect to pass-through. One will assume no pass through, which resembles the situation in which carbon taxation is only applied regionally and there is free trade between regions. In such a case, producers that are taxed are (for most products) expected not to be able to pass on the cost to consumers. Another set will assume 50% pass through, resembling the situation in which the tax is applied more widely.

4 Data and calibration

To perform the stress test, we need data to combine data on the exposure of financial institutions to different asset segments (i.e., industries and types of real estate), data on the vulnerability of these segments to a carbon tax (e.g., carbon intensity), and data to calibrate the contingent claims model (e.g., leverage and asset volatility). We describe our data in the next three sub-sections. Furthermore, as part of the calibration, we estimate a model to predict the non-observable asset volatility of a representative sample of non-listed firms. This is important since non-listed firms are the main beneficiaries of bank funding, while their asset volatility cannot directly be observed.

The choice for our data sources is, to a large extent, driven by the availability of breakdowns that match the segment classification of our exposure data. For corporate exposures, these are industries according to a 2 or 4-digit NACE industry classification, while for mortgages we use a segmentation based on the type of dwelling (e.g., terraced houses, detached houses and apartments). All data is for 2017, except the sectorial exposures to equity for which we only have 2016 data available. For corporate exposures, we include all industries at the 2-digit NACE division with a carbon intensity of more than 0.5 kg CO₂e / euro gross operating surplus. This includes most subsectors within agriculture, forestry and fishing (A), mining and quarrying (B), manufacturing (C), electricity, gas, steam and steam conditioning supply (D), water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities (E), and transportation and storage (H). The choice of these industries is in line with other papers (e.g., Battiston et al. 2017; Vermeulen et al. 2019). We refer to this group as “transition-sensitive industries”.¹³

4.1 Bank sector exposure data

We use two proprietary datasets of the Dutch central bank that provide a detailed breakdown of corporate and residential real estate exposures. Combined, these two asset classes make up 59% of the balance sheet of the Dutch banking sector. Other major asset classes that are outside the scope of our analysis are government loans and debt (11%) and loans and debt to financial institutions (14%) – see Table 1.

For corporate debt exposures, we use a 2017 dataset on the industry classification of the asset holdings of Dutch banks. This dataset is obtained as part of a 2017 climate exposure survey and includes the exposures of the three largest banks in the Netherlands, which together hold 79% of total assets in the Dutch banking sector. In this dataset, corporate loans and debt are categorized using a 4-digit

¹³ The full list of transition-sensitive industries can be found in Table 2.

NACE classification. For each 4-digit NACE class, the dataset provides total exposure and average remaining maturity. For our analysis, we aggregate these exposures to the 2-digit NACE division, in order to match them with Eurostat data on carbon intensity. We calculate the average remaining maturity for each 2-digit NACE division based on the exposure-weighted average remaining maturity..s. For equity exposures, we use a dataset on the sectorial classification of debt and equity, which was part of a 2016 survey on climate-related exposures. This dataset includes the same set of banks as the 2017 data.

Based on these datasets, the largest three Dutch banks hold €208 billion worth of corporate debt and equity in transition-sensitive industries, which equals 11.1% of their total assets. Looking at the 2-digit NACE sectors in transition-sensitive industries, the largest three Dutch banks have, in declining order, the highest exposure to agriculture (A.01), food manufacturing (C.10), water transport (H.50), electricity and gas (D.35), and the extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas (B.06). For a full summary of this data, see table 2.

For residential real estate loan exposures, we use 2017 loan-level data on residential mortgages from the Dutch Central Bank. This dataset covers 67% of the mortgages in the Dutch banking sector. In this dataset, we segment loans according to the type of building (e.g., apartment, town-house, detached). The database includes, at loan-level, the loan-to-value (LTV), remaining maturity, and the last transaction price of the house. The total exposure in the dataset is €497 billion, which equals 32% of total assets in the Dutch banking sector. With respect to residential real estate, the majority of the exposure consists of detached or semi-detached houses which make up about three quarters (76%) of the total residential real estate portfolio. For a full summary of this data, see table 3.

4.2 Vulnerability data

For corporates, we estimate the vulnerability to a carbon tax based on the carbon intensity variable in the Eurostat Structural Business Statistics (SBS) database. This variable provides the amount of Green House Gas emissions as a fraction of gross value added, at the 2-digit NACE division. It includes emissions of CO₂, N₂O and NH₄ in CO₂-equivalents (CO₂e). We adjust the Eurostat carbon intensity variable by subtracting personnel costs from gross added value, to obtain an as close as possible estimation of yearly profitability. Data on personnel costs are obtained from the same SBS database to ensure consistency. The resulting variable provides the kilogrammes of CO₂e emissions per euro gross operating surplus, and thereby an approximation of the fraction of yearly profits that are eroded by each unit of carbon taxation.

For real estate, we estimate the vulnerability to a carbon tax based on the energy use relative to the value of the real estate. For each segment, we calculate the average house price and the associated energy use. We use the average natural gas (per M³) and electricity consumption (in kWh) per dwelling type for 2017 from

the Dutch Statistical Office (CBS) Statline database. We combine these data with emission factors of 1.9 kg CO₂e/M³ for natural gas and 0.355 kg CO₂e/kWh for electricity.¹⁴ The reported carbon intensities are based on annual capital costs, which we derive from average sales prices per dwelling type, also obtained from CBS Statline, at a 3% per annum interest rate (which represents the typical mortgage rate in the Netherlands for a 100% loan-to-value mortgage). Hence, we multiply the average sales price by 0.03. We exclude residential mortgage exposure for which there is no classification for the type of dwelling, or the type of dwelling is of an uncommon nature (e.g., land-only and bungalows). The omitted exposure equals €18,145 million (3.6% of total reported exposures).

4.3 Model calibration

To calibrate the Merton model, we need estimates per industry and real estate segment for four parameters: leverage, asset value volatility, remaining time to maturity, and the risk-free interest rate. In addition, for mortgages, we need an estimate of the probability of delinquency. The remaining time to maturity is available as part of the exposure data for both corporate and residential real estate exposures as an exposure weighted average. Also, the loan-to-value (LTV) ratios are available as part of the exposure data for residential real estate, providing the exposure per segment in 10 LTV buckets. We assume a constant risk-free interest rate of 2%. The remaining challenge is then to obtain estimates for leverage and asset volatility for corporate exposures (both public and private firms), and to obtain estimates for asset volatility and the probability of delinquency for residential real estate exposures.

Corporate exposures

Neither leverage nor asset value volatility is part of the corporate exposure data at the Dutch central bank. To obtain estimates of the leverage per industry, we create a representative portfolio of firms obtained from the Orbis van Dijk database. Since most of the exposures of the Dutch banking sector are in the Netherlands, we obtain the full sample of Dutch firms that are present within the Orbis van Dijk database and then restrict the sample to those firms that have a non-zero and positive amount of long-term debt (which is the closest indicator we could find in the database of firms being bank-funded). For all these firms, we divide total debt by total assets to obtain a measure of the leverage ratio. Moreover, we obtain, for each firm in the sample, their respective 4-digit NACE industry classification code. This allows us to link the sample data to the exposure data.

A key challenge in the calibration process is that the volatility of market values is not directly observable for most firms in the Orbis van Dijk sample of Dutch firms. For each firm in the sample that is publicly listed, we determine the implicit asset value volatility based on the observable volatility of its listed stock. We do this by

¹⁴ CE Delft report, *Emissiekentallen elektriciteit*, 2015 (<https://www.ce.nl/publicaties/download/1786>) and RVO report, *Berekening van de standaard CO₂-emissiefactor aardgas*, 2018.

linking the listed firms in the Orbis van Dijk sample to Thomson Reuters Datastream using their ISIN-codes and obtaining the standard deviation of yearly total equity returns including dividends (computed using the Datastream return index) between 2006 and 2017. We choose this 12-year period to minimize the number of firms for which there is no complete time series available, while still including the variation caused by the global financial crisis in 2007 and 2008. We then transform the standard deviation of equity into implied asset volatility by using the Merton equations in section 3.2 (i.e., simultaneously solving for equations (6) and (9)). We exclude firms for which there are more than three missing values in the 12-year period.

For non-listed firms, we cannot observe the standard deviation of yearly total equity returns. Excluding non-listed firms from the sample can be problematic, however, as this will likely lead to sample bias (non-listed firms are typically smaller, and may make different choices with regards to risk-taking and leverage). Specifically, smaller firms that are typically non-listed may have higher asset volatility than larger firms that are more often listed, due to fewer diversification opportunities within their business boundaries. To obtain an as valid estimate for asset volatility as possible for non-listed firms, we estimate a predictive model for the asset volatility of non-listed firms based on relevant financial and size characteristics that are available within the Orbis database. We first estimate the model using data for listed firms and the used to predict the asset volatility of non-listed firms.

We estimate four models based on a sample of 2,346 listed firms in the EU-15 in transition-sensitive industries, including size, profitability, leverage and liquidity as predictors of asset volatility. All variables except asset volatility are directly obtained from the Orbis database, while asset volatility is obtained via Datastream using the same methodology as for the listed Dutch firms only (described in the previous paragraph). We also include country and industry fixed effects (based on 2-digit NACE industries).

The results for four variants of the OLS-regression are provided in Table 4. For each model, we report the estimated coefficient as well as its t-value. We start with a simple model (model 1) that includes only the natural logarithm of total assets as an explanatory variable, as well as country and industry fixed effects.¹⁵ Total assets are found to be negatively related to asset volatility (-0.031), implying that smaller firms indeed have higher asset volatility than larger firms. This relationship is statistically significant at the $p < 0.01$ level. We then introduce several other potentially relevant variables: the return on assets in model 2 and the leverage and liquidity ratios in model 3. Model 4 provides a full model that includes total assets, return on assets, the leverage ratio and the liquidity ratio. Profitability (i.e., return on assets) is significant in the full specification (model 4) but does not add substantially to the explained variance – the R^2 of model 4 and model 3 are similar at 0.37, while model 3 is simpler by excluding return on assets.

¹⁵ An F -test confirms the significance of the fixed effects. The F -statistic for the country fixed effects is 2.15 (p -value = 0.0077) and for the industry fixed effects $F = 4.20$ (p -value = 0.0000).

For this reason, we use model 3 as our baseline model to estimate the asset value volatility of the non-listed firms.

Table 5 reports the summary statistics for the standard deviation of assets (for the combined set of listed and non-listed firms) and leverage for each sector. The summary statistics are based on a sample of all firms in the Orbis database that are registered in the Netherlands and that are funded by a non-zero amount of long-term debt (this is the category under which the majority of the bank exposures in our analysis would be accounted for). This results in a sample of 6,595 both listed and non-listed firms in transition-sensitive industries. To exclude outliers, we use the winsorization technique for the 5% lowest and highest predicted values. This results in the standard deviation of assets between 0.20 (C.11 Manufacture of beverages) and 0.44 (B.06 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas). With respect to leverage, we find that mean values per industry range between 0.48 (B.09 Mining support service activities) and 0.74 (D.35 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply).

Residential real estate

To obtain a measure the volatility of real estate assets, we use indices of average sales prices that are obtained from the Dutch statistical office (CBS) Statline database. This dataset provides house price indices from 1995 to 2018 with yearly intervals. For the Netherlands as a whole, the average house price has an annual standard deviation of 6.1% over that period. Since this is an aggregate index, we do not measure the idiosyncratic component of asset volatility. For this reason, we also look at a set of house price indices in the same Statline database for the 12 capital cities of the Dutch provinces. The average annual standard deviation of these indices over the 1995-2018 period is 6.6% (with a cross-sectional standard deviation of 1.1% across the 12 cities), which is the number we use in our further analysis.

To estimate the probability of delinquency, we base ourselves on the historical default rates on Dutch mortgages. We believe that this provides a sensible estimate since defaults on mortgages in the Netherlands are only triggered in case of (prolonged) delinquency and not in case of insolvency. We take the long-run annual probability of default for the Dutch mortgages to be 0.96% (Stanga, Vlahu, and de Haan, 2017). We multiply this with the time to maturity of individual mortgages to obtain an estimate of the probability of default over the lifetime of an average mortgage.

5 Climate stress test of the Dutch banking sector

After developing the stress test model and its calibration, in this section we turn to the results of our stress test. We first define a set of scenarios which we employ in our stress test (section 5.1). As is common in financial sector stress tests, we aim to investigate a set of scenarios that is severe, but still plausible. We identify our scenarios based on three characteristics: the level of the carbon tax (i.e., the price per tonne of CO₂e emissions), the timing of the tax (e.g., overnight versus phased-in over time), and the scope of its application (e.g., in a confined region versus globally). We then apply these shocks to exposure data of the Dutch banking sector and describe and interpret our findings (section 5.2). We conclude this section with a sensitivity analysis (section 5.3).

5.1 Shock scenarios

As a starting point, our analysis considers the introduction of a €100 per tonne CO₂e carbon tax, in line with assumptions in Vermeulen et al. (2019). Additionally, we investigate the introduction of a €50 per tonne CO₂e carbon tax and the introduction of a €200 per tonne CO₂e carbon tax. For each level of carbon taxation, we define four policy scenarios. In the first scenario (I), the carbon tax is applied overnight, and we assume that regional application will prevent firms from passing through the tax to consumers (i.e., there is no room for increasing prices, and firms are inter-regional price takers). In the second scenario (II), the carbon tax is phased-in during a 10-year period in which the carbon tax increases linearly. Similar to the first scenario, there is no pass-through. In a third scenario (III), the carbon tax is applied overnight, but we allow firms to pass-through 50% of the tax to consumers (representing a situation where an inter-regional level playing field is maintained, limiting the impact on businesses). Finally, in a fourth scenario (IV), the carbon tax is phased-in during a 10-year period, and we allow firms to pass-through 50% of the tax to consumers.

For all scenarios, we assume that the carbon tax comes on top of the set of climate policies that are already expected (and priced in by the market). In other words, we assume that the shock is unanticipated. Furthermore, we assume that the introduction of the carbon pricing policy does not affect market expectations about further climate policies to follow (i.e., this is a one-shot fix). This assumption is relevant since changing expectations could alter the (expected) future asset volatility within segments and could, in turn, affect the market value of debt. Also, for all scenarios, we assume that the carbon pricing policy is applied to all emissions at their source (e.g., at the point where fossil fuels are burned). We hence focus on our analysis on scope 1 emissions.

To link the scenarios to our model, we relate our scenario assumptions to the parameters in equation (17). Specifically, we vary the path of carbon prices τ_t and the share of the tax that firms are assumed to be able to pass-on to consumers $\varphi_{k,t}$. For scenarios I and III (overnight application) we set τ_t equal to the level of the carbon tax for all years t . For scenarios II and IV we set τ_t to increase linearly from zero to the level of the carbon tax during the first 10 years, and equal to the level of the carbon tax for all years thereafter. For scenarios I and II we set $\varphi_{k,t}$ to zero for all industries k and all time periods t . For scenarios III and IV we set $\varphi_{k,t}$ to 0.5 for all industries k and all time periods t except for t equals zero where we assume no pass-through ($\varphi_{k,t} = 0$), hence implying a one-year period before repricing can occur. For real estate segments k the pass-through parameter $\varphi_{k,t}$ is zero in all cases. However, to ensure consistency in the scenarios, we do adjust the taxation costs for households. For the scenarios without cost pass-through (I and II), we base the taxation costs that are linked to real estate on the use of natural gas only, since the full burden of the tax for electricity would fall onto the electricity producers. For the scenarios with 50% cost pass-through (III and IV), we base the taxation costs that are linked to real estate on the sum of the carbon costs of burning natural gas and 50% of the carbon costs related to the use of electricity. In all scenarios, we assume the interest rate r_k to be constant at 2% and the adaptation parameters $\gamma_{k,t}$ to linearly increase from 0% to 10% or 20% over a period of 5 years, the maximum reduction depending on the potential for electrification and the potential to cost-effectively capture emissions.¹⁶ Details are provided in Table A1 in the appendix.

Finally, to arrive at shocks per unit of asset value, we estimate total asset value for each segment k , using equation (18). For corporates, we base ourselves on the gross operating surplus, obtained from Eurostat, which gives an as close approximation as possible of current profitability. We extrapolate this profitability by calculating the perpetuity value of a cash flow of the same magnitude, using the same discount rate (6%) as used in the NPV calculation of the carbon tax. For real estate, we base ourselves on the average sales prices per housing type, obtained from CBS Statline. This results in a vector of asset valuation shocks ξ_k that represents the net present values losses in each industry k as a fraction of total firm value. These vectors fully quantify our scenarios, and hence any given scenario that produces the same vector ξ_k will produce the same stress test outcome.¹⁷

The resulting asset valuation shocks per industry are provided in Tables 6 and 7. These tables report the asset valuation shocks ξ_k that are calculated using equation (18), per industry (rows) and scenario (I to IV, columns). We find that,

¹⁶ Since we lack the data to estimate the adaptation potential over time in all industries, we make conservative assumptions. We also note that the adaptation parameter reflects the net effect of both savings due to lower carbon emissions (i.e., less tax) and additional costs to achieve those savings.

¹⁷ We note here that this opens up the possibility to use the same approach for other type of scenarios (both climate and non-climate related) that lead to valuation shocks within industries.

under a €100 carbon tax, corporate valuation shocks range between minus 2% (0.02) and minus 89% (0.89). For each industry, shocks are greatest under scenario I (overnight application, no pass-through), followed by scenario III (overnight application, 50% pass-through), scenario II (10 years phase-in, no pass-through), and scenario IV (10 years phase in, 50% pass-through). Industries that are experiencing the highest decline in asset value are the manufacture of basic metals (C.24), the manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products (C.19), and electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply (D.35). Shocks for these industries range between no less than 0.83 and 0.87. For the real-estate segments, asset valuation shocks range between a relatively modest 0.018 and 0.038. The greatest asset valuation shocks are observed under scenario III, which for detached or semi-detached houses yields an asset valuation shock of 0.038, followed by terraced houses (0.035) and apartments (0.028). We note that even modest real estate asset valuation losses can result in substantially increased default risk since most households finance their homes with significant leverage.

5.2 Estimates of the impact of a carbon tax on Dutch banks' balance sheets

Our main results are shown in Table 9. This table reports the stress test results for our four carbon tax scenarios, at three carbon tax levels: €50 / tonne, €100 / tonne, and €200 / tonne. We report both the market value losses for the sample of the three largest Dutch banks, as well as an extrapolation based on market share for the entire Dutch banking sector (using a factor of 1.27).¹⁸ The table also presents the market value losses per major asset class, including corporate loans and debt, corporate equity, and residential mortgages. Finally, the table reports the market value as fractions of total Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital in the Dutch banking sector and the total assets in the Dutch banking sector.

From the table, we distil three major findings. First, for the main estimates for a €100 per tonne carbon tax, total market value losses for the whole Dutch banking system range between €4.5 billion and €35.8 billion, depending on policy choices made. In the most severe scenario (I), in which carbon taxation is applied abruptly, and there is no pass-through (e.g., due to regional application), losses amount to 29.9% of CET1 capital and to 1.5% of total assets. When carbon taxation is instead phased-in over ten years (scenario II), the losses as fractions of CET1 capital and total assets decline to 14.4% and 0.7%, respectively. When carbon taxation is applied abruptly and allowing for 50% pass-through (scenario III), the losses as fractions of CET1 capital and total assets are 7.7% and 0.4%. Finally, for the least severe scenario (IV), in which carbon taxation is phased-in over ten years and allowing for 50% pass-through, the losses as fractions of CET1 capital and total assets are 3.8% and 0.2%. These losses are substantial: comparing outcomes to regular stress test exercises by financial regulators, we find that the market value

¹⁸ The largest three Dutch banks cover 79% of the total assets in the Dutch banking sector. The total Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital for the entire Dutch banking sector was €120 billion in 2017. Total assets were €2,381 billion.

loss under the most severe policy assumptions (scenario I) is of the same order of magnitude (29.9%) as the impact on CET1 capital in the most severe scenarios employed in regular financial sector stress testing. For example, the 2018 stress test by the European Banking Authority (EBA) found that, on aggregate, the CET1 capital of EU banks declines by 19.2% in their adverse scenario, while the EBA also stated that the 2018 stress test was more severe than any previous EU-wide exercise.¹⁹ Additionally, the 2019 stress test by the Federal Reserve found that, on aggregate, the Tier 1 leverage ratio of US banks declines by 19.8% in their severely adverse scenario.²⁰

Second, losses for the Dutch banking sector are primarily driven by exposures to corporate loans and debt. In the €100 carbon tax scenarios, the fraction of losses that are driven by residential mortgages and equity is only between 1% and 2% of total losses. Principal reasons for this finding are the low exposures of Dutch banks to equity instruments in transition-sensitive industries (i.e., less than 1% of total assets) and the low net present value of carbon taxes for most types of housing compared to their valuation, combined with recourse to a borrowers income next to recourse to the underlying real estate (which puts market value losses of real estate mostly as a burden to households and not to the banking sector). Looking at the corporate loans and debt exposure in more detail, the majority of losses for our €100 / tonne estimates are driven, in declining order, by exposure to electricity, gas, steam and air-conditioning (D.35), the manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products (C.19), water transport (H.50), the manufacture of basic metals (C.24), and air transport (H.51). Together, these five industries drive between 83% and 91% of total market value losses in the corporate and mortgage portfolios across the four scenarios. The market value losses for all sectors are reported at a 2-digit NACE aggregation level in Table 10.

Third, the market value losses for Dutch banks' balance sheets increase exponentially with the euro amount of the tax. By looking at the same four scenarios but with lower (€50) and higher (€200) carbon prices, we investigate the sensitivity of our outcomes to the magnitude of the carbon tax. For example, for scenario I we find that at a price level of €50 per tonne, the total market value losses amount to €8 billion. This increases non-linearly to €36 billion for a price level of €100 per tonne (a factor 4.5 compared to €50 per tonne) and to €75 billion for a price level of €200 per tonne (a factor 2.1 compared to €100 per tonne). The exponential increase in market value losses is counteracted by some industries reaching the point where the full market value of the asset is lost. We find the latter to be the case for four industries in Scenario I and III at a price of

¹⁹ <https://eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/eu-wide-stress-testing/2018>. In the adverse scenario, the fully loaded CET1 capital declines from 1,176 billion to 950 billion, which is equivalent to a decline of 19.2%. Key features of the adverse scenario of the EBA 2018 stress test were: a cumulative fall in GDP over 3 years by 2.7%, unemployment reaching 9.7% in 2020, cumulative inflation over 3 years standing at 1.7%, and a cumulative fall in residential and commercial real estate prices over 3 years of 19.1% and 20% respectively.

²⁰ <https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2019-dfast-results-20190621.pdf>. In the adversely severe scenario the Tier 1 leverage ratio declines from 8.6% to 6.9%, which is equivalent to a decline in CET1 capital of 19.8% if other liabilities are constant. The scenario assumes a global recession with the U.S. employment rate rising by more than 6 percentage points to 10 percent, accompanied by a large decline in real estate prices (-25% for house prices and -35% for commercial real estate) and elevated stress in corporate loan markets.

€200 per tonne: the manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products (C.19), the manufacture of basic metals (C.24), electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply (D.35) and air transport (H.51). Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the total market value losses as a function of the price per tonne CO₂e of the carbon tax.

Besides our main results, we provide the results for a specific scenario that estimates the market value losses for the Dutch banking sector in case a major share of fossil fuel assets becomes stranded. To this end, we perform an additional analysis where we investigate stranded assets in the fossil fuel extraction industries covering coal, lignite, oil and natural gas extraction (B.05 and B.06). Since the direct (scope 1) emissions of these sectors are limited, they do not play a large role in driving the main stress test results. However, in case of more stringent climate policies, it is highly likely that these sectors are also affected, either by reduced demand or by other types of climate policies. For example, McGlade and Ekins (2015) find that, globally, a third of current oil reserves, half of the gas reserves and over 80 per cent of coal reserves should remain unused from 2010 to 2050 in order to meet the Paris Agreement target of keeping global warming below two degrees Celsius. We use these estimates for our industry valuation shocks as reported in Table 8: 0.85 for the mining of coal and lignite (B.05), 0.34 for the extraction of crude petroleum (B.061), and 0.50 for the extraction of natural gas (B.062). Results are reported in Table 11. We find that market value losses for this specific scenario amount to €2.1 billion. This equals 1.8% of total CET1 capital in the Dutch banking sector and 0.1% of total assets. Hence an unburnable carbon scenario alone does not seem to affect the Dutch banking sector severely.

5.3 Sensitivity analysis

In this subsection, we test the sensitivity of the outcomes of our stress test to changes in key assumptions. Results are reported in Table 12. In this table, we present the outcomes of our €100 carbon tax scenarios, based on alternative assumptions relating to the risk-free interest rate, the ease with which firms can adapt to the carbon tax (e.g., by investing in carbon abatement technologies), and allowing for firm-level variation in leverage and asset volatility (instead of taking the average leverage and asset volatility for the entire industry). The first two represent parameters in our modelling that are relatively hard to determine, either because they are not known yet (i.e., the future risk-free interest rate) or because the estimates of the parameters are not readily available (i.e., the industry-specific abatement curves that determine the rate with which firms can reduce their carbon footprint γ_i). The latter represents a refinement of our modelling, which we introduce to show that within industry variation in the calibration parameters matters for the outcome (and loosening our previous assumption of representative firms in an industry).

The first panel (A) of Table 12 reports outcomes based on a risk-free interest rate that is constant over time at a rate of 0%, instead of 2% which is assumed in our main analysis. This assumption reflects a ‘low-for-long’ scenarios with respect to risk-free interest rates in the euro area. We find that lowering the risk-free interest rate to 0% increases the market value losses in all four scenarios; however, not to the same extent. Losses as a fraction of CET1-capital are 32.5% (scenario I), 16.6% (scenario II), 9.8% (scenario III), and 5.3% (scenario IV). These represent increases over the baseline scenario of 8.7%, 15.6%, 27.7%, and 40.7%, respectively. These increases are, to a large extent, driven by market value losses for residential mortgages, and is primarily due to their relatively long duration k.

The second panel (B) of Table 12 reports outcomes based on an increased ability of firms to cost-effectively reduce their carbon footprint. Specifically, we double the adaptation parameters presented in Table A1. This results in adaptation parameters between 20% and 40%, depending on the potential for electrification and the potential to capture emissions. We find that increasing the ability to reduce carbon footprints decreases the market value losses for banks. Losses as a fraction of CET1-capital are 19.4% (scenario I), 9.8% (scenario II), 5.8% (scenario III), and 2.8% (scenario IV). These represent decreases over the baseline scenario of 34.9%, 32.1%, 24.0%, and 25.6%, respectively. This result is primarily driven by exposures to corporate loans and debt.

Finally, the third panel (C) of Table 12 reports the outcomes where we introduce firm-level variation in leverage and asset volatility in the corporate loan portfolio. One challenge to our results is that we employ a “representative firm” approach, by defining average parameter values for leverage and asset volatility per industry (e.g., a 2-digit NACE industry). To check whether this has a substantial impact on results, we estimate our model for each of the 6,595 firms in our sample individually. These include all firms in the Orbis database that are registered in the Netherlands and that are funded by a non-zero amount of long-term debt (which is the category under which the majority of bank lending would be accounted for). We estimate an asset valuation shock for each of these firms, and then aggregate these shocks by taking the long-term debt weighted average for all firms within an industry. We find that this approach increases the market value losses for banks. Losses as a fraction of CET1-capital are 34.5% (scenario I), 18.1% (scenario II), 10.1% (scenario III), and 5.2% (scenario IV). These represent increases over the baseline scenario of 15.4%, 25.6%, 31.5%, and 37.0%, respectively. We thus show that a representative firm approach may underestimate shocks in a Merton setting, which is at least partly driven by the non-linear increase in market value losses when solvent firms approach their default point.

6 Conclusion and discussion

Current trajectories of carbon emissions lead to a global warming scenario of three to four degree Celsius (Rogelj et al., 2013). That is well beyond the safe boundary of keeping global warming below two degree Celsius. A sudden tightening of climate policies is therefore possible. Using the Merton methodology to assess the impact of the introduction of a carbon tax on equity- and debt-type assets allows us to calculate the impact on bank assets. Current studies of climate stress tests that take a industry-level approach look primarily at losses on equities and thus underestimate carbon risk, while macro-econometric approaches are intractable and rely on strong assumptions regarding GDP channels.

Using our novel climate stress testing methodology, we find that 3.8% to 29.9% of the available Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital of the Dutch banking system is wiped out in first-round losses following the implementation of a sizeable carbon tax of €100, depending on the geographical scope of application and abruptness of the policy. These estimates can be seen as a lower bound, as second-round effects could lead to further losses. Moreover, first-round losses increase exponentially with the size of the carbon tax. A carbon tax of €200 leads to first-round losses of 14.9% to 62.6% of the available CET1 capital of the Dutch banking system. Losses in some of the more severe scenarios are of the same order of magnitude (for €100 per tonne) and higher (for €200 per tonne) as those obtained under the severe scenarios in more traditional financial sector stress tests. This indicates that climate-related scenarios are of relevance to prudential supervisors and may warrant increased alignment between prudential policymakers and climate policymakers. This to avoid severe losses in the financial system while at the same time achieving a decarbonization of the economy in line with international climate agreements.

Our analysis has several limitations. First, we focus our attention to market value effects that are an immediate result of asset valuation shocks. We hence do not account for general-equilibrium effects, such as potentially increasing unemployment, as well as other second-round losses due to exposures between financial institutions. Second, the Merton model assumes no additional costs at bankruptcy and no sudden jumps in asset value. Both of these limitations are likely to result in a conservative estimation of total losses, implying that our results reflect a lower bound estimate of total market value losses in the investigated scenarios. Third, our scenarios do not include potential valuation changes in industries that are not necessarily carbon intensive but that are dependent on carbon-intensive value chains (such as the traditional, fossil-fuel based, car industry) or that tend to benefit from climate policies (such as renewables and electric car producers). Incorporating the potential valuation shocks to such industries is, in our view, an important avenue for future research. Finally, our

analysis assumes that, besides the asset value shock, the parameters in the Merton model remain constant. We hence implicitly assume that our scenario shocks do not alter asset value volatility and/or the risk-free interest rate.

Our findings are relevant to macro-prudential supervisors, micro-prudential supervisors, and other financial sector participants. For macro-prudential supervisors, our results show that strong carbon pricing policies have the potential to substantially alter the market value of a broad range of assets on banks' balance sheets. This is in line with previous findings in Battiston et al. (2017) and Vermeulen et al. (2019). As a consequence, from a systemic mandate, macro-prudential authorities may wish to engage in an ongoing dialogue with climate policymakers in order to achieve orderly decarbonization of the economy. For micro-prudential supervisors, our results point to those assets and industries that are of a heightened risk of losing their value in an energy transition. This could have implications for the risk scoring of individual financial institutions that are, to a greater extent, exposed to these industries (e.g., specialized banks such as agricultural banks). And finally, our results have implications for financial institutions in their assessment and pricing of transition-related financial risks. In particular, it provides estimates of market value losses in the tail-end of the distribution. This can help financial institutions set risk limits, and could provide input into their loan origination, investment, and pricing decisions. For the latter, however, a key missing parameter is the probability of scenarios occurring and having a full set of scenarios. We would also encourage further research into the pricing of climate risk based on forward-looking scenarios.

7 References

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8 Tables and figures

TABLE 1 – AGGREGATE ASSETS IN THE EURO AREA AND DUTCH BANKING SECTOR

This table reports the aggregate balance sheet of banks in the euro area and the Netherlands. The shaded area (dark grey) shows the assets for which we have granular exposure data available and that are in the scope of our analysis. These assets together represent 59% of the aggregated balance sheet of the Dutch banking sector. All data is for 2017 and obtained from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse.

	Euro area		Netherlands	
	€ trillion	Percentage of total	€ trillion	Percentage of total
Equity exposures	0.54	2%	0.02	1%
Corporate loans and debt	5.08	23%	0.59	26%
Residential mortgages	3.84	17%	0.74	32%
Consumer loans (non-mortgage household loans)	1.88	8%	0.05	2%
Government loans and debt	2.82	13%	0.25	11%
Financial corporate loans and debt	3.38	15%	0.32	14%
Central bank loans and debt	1.84	8%	0.16	7%
Other	2.91	13%	0.15	7%
Total	22.30	100%	2.28	100%

TABLE 2 – CARBON FOOTPRINT AND EXPOSURES IN THE CORPORATE LOANS AND DEBT PORTFOLIO

This table reports exposures and carbon intensity per industry. For our analysis, we focus on a subset of two-digit NACE industries that have carbon footprints higher than 0.5 (we refer to these industries from hereon as transition-sensitive industries). Carbon footprint data is based on Eurostat carbon intensity per gross value added and includes emissions of CO₂, N₂O and NH₄ in CO₂-equivalents (CO₂e). We adjust the Eurostat carbon intensity data to reflect the profitability of industries as close as possible by subtracting personnel costs from gross value-added, in order to arrive at carbon emissions per euro gross operating surplus. Data to make this adjustment is however not available for Agriculture, forestry and fishing (A.01 to A.03). For these industries we estimate the carbon intensity based by taking the ratio of gross operating surplus and gross value added from the Dutch national accounts provided by the Dutch Statistical Office (CBS). Moreover, not all Eurostat carbon intensity data is available at a 2-digit NACE industry level. Industries for which only a higher level of aggregation is available are denoted with an asterisk (*). Exposure amounts include debt and equity and are based on a sample of the three largest Dutch banks, covering 79% of the assets in the Dutch banking sector. All figures are for the Netherlands and for 2017. Data is obtained from the Dutch central bank (DNB) and Eurostat.

		Carbon footprint (kg CO₂e / euro gross operating surplus)	Exposure (€ million)
A.01	Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities	2.75	65,793
A.02	Forestry and logging	0.65	2,946
A.03	Fishing and aquaculture	1.39	1,117
B.05	Mining of coal and lignite	0.56*	0
B.06	Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas	0.56*	11,307
B.07	Mining of metal ores	0.56*	0
B.08	Other mining and quarrying	0.56*	827
B.09	Mining support service activities	0.56*	9,404
C.10	Manufacture of food products	0.71*	26,499
C.11	Manufacture of beverages	0.71*	6,996
C.12	Manufacture of tobacco products	0.71*	1,018
C.17	Manufacture of paper and paper products	1.26	3,546
C.19	Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products	9.51	7,153

C.20	Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products	3.24	10,109
C.23	Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products	2.79	3,076
C.24	Manufacture of basic metals	9.75	3,427
D.35	Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply	10.08	20,434
E.37	Sewerage	5.02*	22
E.38	Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery	5.02*	1,778
E.39	Remediation activities and other waste management services	5.02*	134
H.49	Land transport and transport via pipelines	1.56	9,272
H.50	Water transport	3.96	20,932
H.51	Air transport	8.82	2,284

TABLE 3 – CARBON FOOTPRINT AND EXPOSURES IN THE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES PORTFOLIO

This table reports residential mortgages exposure and carbon footprint per type of dwelling. Exposure amounts are based on a sample of 9 Dutch banks, covering 67% of the total aggregated residential mortgages exposure on the balance sheets of Dutch banks. To calculate the carbon footprint, we use the average natural gas (per M3) and electricity consumption (in kWh) per housing type for 2017 from the Dutch Statistical Office (CBS) Statline database. We combine these data with emission factors of 1.9 kg CO₂e/M³ for natural gas and 0.355 kg CO₂e/kWh for electricity. The reported carbon intensities are based on the annual capital cost which we derive from average sales prices per housing type, also obtained from CBS Statline, assuming a 3% per annum mortgage interest rate (hence multiplying the average sales price by 0.03). We exclude residential mortgage exposure for which there is no classification for the type of dwelling or the type of dwelling is of an uncommon nature (e.g., land-only and bungalows). The omitted exposure equals €18,145 million (3.6% of total reported exposures).

	Carbon footprint (kg CO ₂ e / euro annual capital cost)		Exposure (€ million)
	Based on natural gas consumption	Based on total energy consumption	
Flat/Apartment	0.25	0.36	65,022
Terraced House	0.31	0.45	51,210
Detached or semi-detached	0.36	0.48	363,103

	Standard deviation of assets (estimated based on Model 5)				Leverage		
	N	Mean	Standard deviation	Asset weighted mean	Mean	Standard deviation	Asset weighted mean
A.01 Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities	2,316	0.23	0.13	0.19	0.56	0.25	0.54
A.02 Forestry and logging	18	0.22	0.15	0.23	0.58	0.27	0.50
A.03 Fishing and aquaculture	102	0.42	0.09	0.55	0.55	0.24	0.47
B.05 Mining of coal and lignite	0	-	-	-	-	-	-
B.06 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas	18	0.44	0.08	0.37	0.54	0.34	0.70
B.07 Mining of metal ores	0	-	-	-	-	-	-
B.08 Other mining and quarrying	42	0.45	0.08	0.45	0.61	0.24	0.56
B.09 Mining support service activities	56	0.38	0.11	0.32	0.48	0.26	0.37
C.10 Manufacture of food products	548	0.32	0.11	0.20	0.60	0.23	0.46
C.11 Manufacture of beverages	39	0.22	0.09	0.07	0.59	0.20	0.63
C.12 Manufacture of tobacco products	4	0.25	0.14	0.22	0.52	0.24	0.58
C.17 Manufacture of paper and paper products	107	0.29	0.10	0.16	0.65	0.21	0.70
C.19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products	12	0.22	0.13	0.12	0.64	0.24	0.79
C.20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products	200	0.25	0.12	0.17	0.56	0.22	0.55
C.23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products	172	0.26	0.11	0.11	0.65	0.21	0.71
C.24 Manufacture of basic metals	76	0.36	0.10	0.32	0.59	0.22	0.45
D.35 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply	310	0.24	0.13	0.25	0.74	0.25	0.49
E.37 Sewerage	24	0.23	0.13	0.20	0.57	0.27	0.57
E.38 Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery	255	0.22	0.12	0.17	0.65	0.24	0.65
E.39 Remediation activities and other waste management services	50	0.24	0.13	0.20	0.67	0.24	0.65
H.49 Land transport and transport via pipelines	1,649	0.24	0.11	0.16	0.67	0.21	0.57
H.50 Water transport	274	0.32	0.15	0.29	0.65	0.25	0.65
H.51 Air transport	13	0.26	0.14	0.07	0.68	0.26	0.90

TABLE 4 – PREDICTION MODEL FOR ASSET VOLATILITY OF NON-LISTED FIRMS

This table reports the OLS-regression results for different models to predict the yearly standard deviation of asset value (asset volatility). We base our analysis on a sample of 2,346 listed firms in the EU-15 in transition-sensitive industries, obtained from the Bureau van Dijk Orbis database. All variables except asset volatility are directly taken from the Orbis database. We also obtain for all firms their ISIN code, which we use to obtain the yearly standard deviation of equity value (based on the return index of stock prices between 2006 and 2018) via Thomson Reuters Datastream. We then transform the standard deviation of equity into asset volatility by using the Merton equations as put forward in section 3.2 (i.e., simultaneously solving for equations (5) and (8)). We exclude firms for which there are more than three missing values in the 12-year period based on which we calculate the standard deviation of equity value. Furthermore, we exclude firms with the 1% largest and smallest values for asset volatility and 1% of firms with the largest leverage. This results in an estimation sample of 1,548 firms. We perform F-tests to confirm the significance of the sets of dummy variables in the full model. The F-statistic for the country dummy variables is 2.15 (prob > F = 0.0077) and for the industry dummy variables 4.20 (prob > F = 0.0000), based on the full model (Model 2). T-values are reported within brackets, *** denotes a significance-level of 1%.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Total assets (natural logarithm)	-0.031*** (-9.54)	-0.016*** (-4.88)	-0.019*** (-6.32)	-0.031*** (-10.02)
Return on assets	-0.000 (-0.30)	-0.001*** (-2.64)	-	-
Leverage ratio	-	-0.502*** (-13.88)	-0.486*** (-13.66)	-
Liquidity ratio	-	0.005*** (3.41)	0.005*** (3.50)	-
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.26	0.37	0.37	0.26
N	1,532	1,521	1,537	1,548

TABLE 5 – SUMMARY STATISTICS OF CORPORATE LOANS AND DEBT CALIBRATION SAMPLE

This table reports summary statistics by industry for the sample of firms that we use to calibrate the Merton model. We base ourselves on all firms in the Orbis database that are registered in the Netherlands and that are funded by a non-zero amount of long-term debt (this is the category under which the majority of the bank exposures in our analysis would be accounted for). This results in a sample of 6,595 listed and non-listed firms in transition-sensitive industries. For the non-listed firms, we estimate the standard deviation of assets based on Model 3, as reported in table 4. We winsorize the 5% lowest and highest predicted values, which results in a range of predicted values for asset variation of individual firms in the sample between 0.05 and 0.49. Note that, in line with the exposures of the largest three Dutch banks, there are no registered Dutch firms in the NACE industries B.05 and B.07 in the Orbis database.

TABLE 6 – ESTIMATED ASSET VALUATION SHOCKS BY INDUSTRY IN €100 CARBON TAX SCENARIO

This table reports the asset valuation shocks ξ_k estimated by industry in four different scenarios. All shocks are reported as net present value losses as a fraction of total firm value, using equations (17) and (18). The scenarios differ based on the path of carbon prices τ_t and the share of the tax that firms are assumed to be able to pass-on to consumers $\varphi_{k,t}$. Scenarios I and II reflect the situation where there is no pass-through of costs to consumers (which can be thought of as more regional application, without a level-playing field), while scenarios III and IV reflect the situation where 50% of the cost of the tax is passed through to consumers (which can be thought of as more global application, where a level-playing field is largely maintained). Furthermore, scenarios I and III are based on an overnight application of the tax, which then remains constant at €100 / tonne CO₂e. Scenarios II and IV are based on a linear phase-in of the tax over a period of 10 years, after which it remains constant at €100 / tonne CO₂e. Carbon emissions are obtained from the Eurostat Air Emissions Accounts (AEA) database, while total asset value is based on the gross operating surplus as obtained from the Eurostat Structural Business Statistics (SBS) Database. All data is for the Netherlands and for 2017.

	I	II	III	IV
A.01 Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities	0.25	0.13	0.18	0.09
A.02 Forestry and logging	0.06	0.03	0.04	0.02
A.03 Fishing and aquaculture	0.13	0.07	0.09	0.05
B.05 Mining of coal and lignite	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.02
B.06 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.02
B.07 Mining of metal ores	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.02
B.08 Other mining and quarrying	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.02
B.09 Mining support service activities	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.02
C.10 Manufacture of food products	0.06	0.03	0.05	0.02
C.11 Manufacture of beverages	0.06	0.03	0.05	0.02
C.12 Manufacture of tobacco products	0.06	0.03	0.05	0.02
C.17 Manufacture of paper and paper products	0.11	0.06	0.08	0.04
C.19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products	0.87	0.46	0.64	0.32
C.20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products	0.30	0.16	0.22	0.11
C.23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products	0.25	0.14	0.19	0.09
C.24 Manufacture of basic metals	0.89	0.48	0.66	0.33
D.35 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply	0.83	0.45	0.60	0.31

E.37	Sewerage	0.46	0.25	0.34	0.17
E.38	Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery	0.46	0.25	0.34	0.17
E.39	Remediation activities and other waste management services	0.46	0.25	0.34	0.17
H.49	Land transport and transport via pipelines	0.14	0.07	0.09	0.05
H.50	Water transport	0.36	0.18	0.24	0.12
H.51	Air transport	0.80	0.43	0.59	0.30

TABLE 7 – ESTIMATED ASSET VALUATION SHOCKS FOR RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE IN €100 CARBON TAX SCENARIO

This table reports the asset valuation shocks ξ_k estimated for residential real estate in four different scenarios. All shocks are reported as net present value losses as a fraction of total real estate value, using equations (16) and (17). The scenarios differ based on the path of carbon prices τ_t and the amount of the tax that firms are assumed to be able to pass-on to consumers $\varphi_{k,t}$. In the scenarios (I and II) where there is no pass-through of costs to consumers, we base the asset valuation shock on the use of natural gas only (since electricity is assumed not to increase in price). In the scenarios (III and IV) where there is 50% pass-through of costs to consumers, we base the asset valuation shock on the total use of energy (natural gas and electricity). Furthermore, scenarios I and III are based on an overnight application of the tax, which then remains constant at €100 / tonne CO₂e. Scenarios II and IV are based on a linear phase-in of the tax over a period of 10 years, after which it remains constant at €100 / tonne CO₂e. All data is for 2017 and obtained from the Dutch statistical office (CBS).

	I	II	III	IV
Apartment	0.023	0.018	0.028	0.022
Terraced house	0.028	0.022	0.035	0.027
Detached or semi-detached house	0.033	0.026	0.038	0.030

TABLE 8 – ASSET VALUATION SHOCKS FOR UNBURNABLE CARBON IN FOSSIL FUEL STRANDED ASSETS SCENARIO

This table reports asset valuation shocks for the extractive industries (coal, lignite, crude petroleum and natural gas) that are based on the fraction of fossil fuel reserves that cannot be burned if global warming is to be limited to two degrees Celsius, as reported by McGlade and Ekins (2015). We take the average value for scenarios with and without Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS).

	2-degrees alignment of fossil fuel extraction
B.05 Mining of coal and lignite	0.85
B.061 Extraction of crude petroleum	0.34
B.062 Extraction of natural gas	0.50

TABLE 9 – MARKET VALUE LOSSES FOR DIFFERENT CARBON TAX SCENARIOS, IN € MILLION

This table reports the stress test results for our four carbon tax scenarios. Total market value losses are reported for the sample of the three largest banks and extrapolated to the entire Dutch banking sector (market estimate). The total Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital for the Dutch banking sector was €120 billion in 2017. Total assets were €2,381 billion.

	Scenario I • Regional • Abrupt	Scenario II • Regional • Phase-in	Scenario III • Global • Abrupt	Scenario IV • Global • Phase-in
€50 / tonne carbon tax				
Corporate loans and debt	6,259	3,372	1,926	1,073
Corporate equity	0	0	0	0
Residential mortgages	73	57	85	66
Total (three largest banks)	6,332	3,428	2,011	1,140
Total (market estimate)	8,041	4,354	2,555	1,447
% of CET1 capital	6.7%	3.6%	2.1%	1.2%
% of total assets	0.3%	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%

€100 / tonne carbon tax

Corporate loans and debt	28,063	13,480	7,071	3,435
Corporate equity	1	0	0	0
Residential mortgages	152	117	181	139
Total (three largest banks)	28,216	13,597	7,252	3,574
Total (market estimate)	35,834	17,268	9,210	4,539
% of CET1 capital	29.9%	14.4%	7.7%	3.8%
% of total assets	1.5%	0.7%	0.4%	0.2%

€200 / tonne carbon tax

Corporate loans and debt	58,840	43,848	32,444	13,780
Corporate equity	1	1	0	0
Residential mortgages	335	253	405	303
Total (three largest banks)	59,176	44,101	32,849	14,084
Total (market estimate)	75,153	56,009	41,718	17,886
% of CET1 capital	62.6%	46.7%	34.8%	14.9%
% of total assets	3.2%	2.4%	1.8%	0.8%

TABLE 10 – MARKET VALUE LOSSES PER INDUSTRY, IN € BILLION (€100 / TONNE CARBON TAX)

This table reports the contribution of individual industries to total market value losses in the four main €100 / tonne carbon tax scenarios, for the total sample of the three largest Dutch banks. The largest absolute contributions to market value losses are, in declining order, obtained for electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply (D.35), the manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products (C.19), water transport (H.50), the manufacture of basic metals (C.24), air transport (H.51) and crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities (A.01).

	I	II	III	IV
A.01 Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities	1.53	0.85	0.50	0.30
A.02 Forestry and logging	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00
A.03 Fishing and aquaculture	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
B.05 Mining of coal and lignite	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
B.06 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas	0.17	0.13	0.09	0.06
B.07 Mining of metal ores	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
B.08 Other mining and quarrying	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00
B.09 Mining support service activities	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01
C.10 Manufacture of food products	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
C.11 Manufacture of beverages	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
C.12 Manufacture of tobacco products	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
C.17 Manufacture of paper and paper products	0.05	0.03	0.02	0.01
C.19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products	5.90	3.76	2.12	0.92
C.20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products	0.15	0.06	0.03	0.01
C.23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products	0.09	0.04	0.02	0.01
C.24 Manufacture of basic metals	2.53	0.97	0.39	0.17
D.35 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply	12.78	4.86	2.13	0.92
E.37 Sewerage	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
E.38 Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery	0.28	0.13	0.06	0.03
E.39 Remediation activities and other waste management services	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00
H.49 Land transport and transport via pipelines	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01
H.50 Water transport	2.67	1.39	0.91	0.57

H.51 Air transport	1.75	1.18	0.74	0.39
- Detached or semi-detached house	0.12	0.09	0.14	0.11
- Apartment	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02
- Terraced house	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02
Total	28.22	13.60	7.25	3.57

TABLE 11 - MARKET VALUE LOSSES FOR UNBURNABLE CARBON, IN € MILLION

This table reports the outcome for a partial stress test in a fossil fuel stranded assets scenario based on the shocks presented in Table 8. Total market value losses are reported for the sample of the three largest banks and extrapolated to the entire Dutch banking sector. The total Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital for the entire Dutch banking sector was €120 billion in 2017. Total assets were €2,381 billion. We note that our sample does not include any exposure to B.05 (mining of coal and lignite).

	2-degrees alignment of fossil fuel extraction
Corporate loans and debt	1,680
Total (three largest banks)	1,680
Total (market estimate)	2,134
% of CET1 capital	1.8%
% of total assets	0.1%

TABLE 12 – SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

This table reports market value losses for the €100 carbon tax scenarios, using alternative assumptions. Panel (A) reports outcomes based on a risk-free interest that is constant over time at a rate of 0% instead of 2%. Panel (B) reports outcomes assuming double the potential for cost-effective carbon abatement (20% or 40%). Panel (C) reports outcomes by running the Merton model at the firm level in the corporate portfolios, thereby allowing for variation in the leverage and asset volatility parameters. The underlined percentages report the difference compared to the main estimate outcome in Table 9.


	Scenario I • Regional • Abrupt	Scenario II • Regional • Phase-in	Scenario III • Global • Abrupt	Scenario IV • Global • Phase-in
(A) risk-free interest rate at 0%				
Corporate loans and debt	29,799	15,021	8,203	4,206
Corporate equity	0	0	0	0
Residential mortgages	897	698	1,060	823
Total (three largest banks)	30,696	15,720	9,263	5,029
Total (market estimate)	38,984	19,964	11,764	6,387
% of CET1 capital	32.5%	16.6%	9.8%	5.3%
% of total assets	1.6%	0.8%	0.5%	0.3%
<u>Difference with main estimate</u>	<u>+8.7%</u>	<u>+15.6%</u>	<u>+27.7%</u>	<u>+40.7%</u>
(B) +100% abatement potential				
Corporate loans and debt	18,222	9,119	5,327	2,521
Corporate equity	0	0	0	0
Residential mortgages	152	117	181	139
Total (three largest banks)	18,374	9,236	5,508	2,660
Total (market estimate)	23,335	11,730	6,995	3,378
% of CET1 capital	19.4%	9.8%	5.8%	2.8%
% of total assets	1.0%	0.5%	0.3%	0.1%
<u>Difference with main estimate</u>	<u>-34.9%</u>	<u>-32.1%</u>	<u>-24.0%</u>	<u>-25.6%</u>

(C) including firm-level variation in leverage and asset volatility

Corporate loans and debt	32,418	16,954	9,352	4,758
Corporate equity	1	0	0	0
Residential mortgages	152	117	181	139
Total (three largest banks)	32,571	17,071	9,533	4,897
Total (market estimate)	41,365	21,680	12,107	6,219
% of CET1 capital	34.5%	18.1%	10.1%	5.2%
% of total assets	1.7%	0.9%	0.5%	0.3%
<u>Difference with main estimate</u>	<u>+15.4%</u>	<u>+25.6%</u>	<u>+31.5%</u>	<u>+37.0%</u>

FIGURE 1 – MARKET VALUE LOSSES IN THE DUTCH BANKING SECTOR AS % OF TOTAL CET1 CAPITAL

This figure shows the total market value losses (as a percentage of total CET1 capital) in the four main scenarios as a function of the price per tonne CO₂e of the carbon tax. In the first scenario (I), the carbon tax is applied overnight, and we assume that regional application will prevent firms from passing through the tax to consumers (i.e., there is no room for increasing prices, and firms are inter-regional price takers). In the second scenario (II), the carbon tax is phased-in during a 10-year period in which the carbon tax increases linearly. Similar to the first scenario, there is no pass-through. In a third scenario (III), the carbon tax is applied overnight, but we allow firms to pass-through 50% of the tax to consumers (representing a situation where an inter-regional level playing field is maintained, limiting the impact on businesses). Finally, in a fourth scenario (IV), the carbon tax is phased-in during a 10-year period, and we allow firms to pass-through 50% of the tax to consumers. Discontinuities in the curve occur when an industry reaches the point where the full market value of the assets is lost. Total market value losses are based on estimates for a sample of the three largest Dutch banks and extrapolated to the entire Dutch banking sector. The total Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital for the entire Dutch banking sector was €120 billion in 2017.



9 Appendix

TABLE A1 – PARAMETER ASSUMPTIONS FOR ABATEMENT POTENTIAL

This table reports the assumptions for abatement potential over time, which we operationalize as a decline in carbon footprint γ_t over time. For all industries, we take a linear reduction of carbon footprint over five years. We conservatively assume the maximum reduction to be 10% for all industries unless the industry has strong potential for electrification (land and water transport) or strong potential to capture emissions (electric power generation). In those cases, we take abatement potential to be 20%.

NACE Rev. 2	Industry	Abatement potential
A.01	Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities	10% (5 yr)
A.02	Forestry and logging	10% (5 yr)
A.03	Fishing and aquaculture	10% (5 yr)
B.05	Mining of coal and lignite	10% (5 yr)
B.06	Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas	10% (5 yr)
B.07	Mining of metal ores	10% (5 yr)
B.08	Other mining and quarrying	10% (5 yr)
B.09	Mining support service activities	10% (5 yr)
C.10	Manufacture of food products	10% (5 yr)
C.11	Manufacture of beverages	10% (5 yr)
C.12	Manufacture of tobacco products	10% (5 yr)
C.17	Manufacture of paper and paper products	10% (5 yr)
C.19	Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products	10% (5 yr)
C.20	Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products	10% (5 yr)
C.23	Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products	10% (5 yr)
C.24	Manufacture of basic metals	10% (5 yr)
D.35	Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply	20% (5 yr)
E.37	Sewerage	10% (5 yr)
E.38	Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery	10% (5 yr)

E.39	Remediation activities and other waste management services	10% (5 yr)
H.49	Land transport and transport via pipelines	20% (5 yr)
H.50	Water transport	20% (5 yr)
H.51	Air transport	10% (5 yr)